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Beyond the Courtroom: 
Accountability for Grave and 
Systemic Human Rights 
Violations 
Meghan Campbell* 
Abstract 
Achieving accountability for grave and systemic human rights abuses is not 
simple or straightforward. Questions arise on whether individualised, 
court-based forums can adequately tackle the norms, institutions and 
systems that underpin endemic injustices. There are many exciting 
accountability innovations happening around the world. An overlooked 
innovation is the inquiry procedure under the UN treaty bodies. This 
procedure, in theory, holds significant potential, as it is exclusively directed 
towards investigating and remedying ‘grave and systemic’ human rights 
issues. Although, several treaty bodies can conduct inquiries, the CEDAW 
Committee is the only treaty body to have built up a body of jurisprudence. 
At this early stage in the history of the inquiry procedure, this article asks: 
what contribution have the inquiries from the OP-CEDAW made to 
reconceptualising accountability for systemic violations of human rights? 
To answer this question, the article begins by mapping the prominent 
blockages to accountability in traditional, individualised court-based 
accountability forums. It then proceeds to evaluate whether the inquiries 
under the OP-CEDAW can overcome these blockages. There are 
multiple strengths to pursuing accountability for grave and systemic abuses 
through the inquiry procedure. The institutional design, particularly the 
active role provided for civil society organisations (CSOs) and the 
CEDAW Committee, means that human rights abuses do not go 
unchallenged because of costs or technical legal rules. The intense focus 
on one specific grave and systemic issue sheds light on the embedded and 
interwoven structures and attitudes that underpin endemic human rights 
                                           
* Lecturer in Law, Birmingham Law School and Deputy-Director of the Oxford Human 
Rights Hub, m.campbell.1@bham.ac.uk. Many thanks to Ben Warwick, Fiona de Londras, 
Sandy Fredman and the participants of Beyond Human Rights Workshop in Bogota 
Colombia, October 2017.   
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violations. In turn, this gives the CEDAW Committee a strong basis on 
which to propose targeted recommendations to prevent further violations. 
The article concludes by identifying areas for reflection and future reform 
as the UN treaty bodies continue to conduct inquiry procedures.  
 
Keywords: Inquiry Procedure; UN Treaty Bodies; Grave and Systemic 
Human Rights; Structural Remedies; CEDAW  
1. Introduction 
There are questions about whether traditional, individualised, adversarial 
forums can grapple with grave and systemic human rights violations.
1
 Even 
more fundamentally, there are concerns that human rights as a framework 
cannot address endemic injustices.
2
 Past failures, however, should not lead 
to cynicism or to abandoning efforts to use the law to uphold human rights. 
The unhappiness with conventional adversarial forums needs to be a call 
to reimagine how accountability mechanisms can take account of gross and 
widespread human rights abuses. There are many exciting innovations: 
positive duties to eliminate discrimination;
3
 public interest litigation;
4
 court 
supervision of remedial orders
5
 and truth and reconciliation commissions.
6
 
Taken together, these efforts aim to modify current models and create new 
accountability forums that can address systemic human rights violations 
and ‘facilitate structural and institutional change.’ 7  Although these 
measures have been critiqued,
8
 there is a continued striving to refine 
accountability platforms so that they can strike at the root of human rights 
                                           
1 Kent Roach, ‘Polycentricity and Queue Jumping in Public Law Remedies: A Two-Track 
Response’ (2016) 66(1) University of Toronto Law Journal 3, 35-6. 
2Gunther Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism Beyond the Nation State’ in Petra Dobner 
and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism (OUP 2010) 338. 
3 Section 149, Equality Act 2010 (UK). 
4Jason Brickhill and Yana Van Leeve, ‘From the Courtroom to the Classroom: Litigation 
Education Rights in South Africa’ in Sandra Fredman, Meghan Campbell and Helen Taylor 
(eds), Human Rights and Equality in Education (Policy Press 2018). 
5Madzodzo and Others v Minister of Basic Education and Others 2014 (3) SA 441 (ECM) 
(South Africa). 
6Truth and Reconciliation Commission, The Report <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/> 
accessed 9 January 2018.  
7 Sandra Fredman, ‘Making Equality Effective: The Role of Proactive Measures’ (2010) 
European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities, Unit EMPL/G/2. 
8 Aileen McColgan, ‘Litigating the Public Sector Equality Duty: The Story So far’ 35(3) 
(2015) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 453; Matt James, ‘A Carnival of Truth? Knowledge, 
Ignorance and the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ (2012) The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 1.  
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abuses. One such mechanism is the inquiry procedure into grave and 
systemic human rights violations available under a select number of UN 
human rights treaties. This article focuses on the inquiry procedures 
conducted under the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women
9
 (CEDAW) and assesses how this 
overlooked mechanism offers accountability for grave and systemic 
violations of human rights.   
Through its various mechanisms, the UN human rights treaty body 
system is creatively responding to the accountability challenges for human 
rights. Little serious attention has been paid to the inquiry procedure.
10
 In 
theory, it holds significant potential as it is specifically targeted towards 
‘grave and systemic’ human rights issues.11 The CEDAW Committee is the 
only treaty body which has built up a body of jurisprudence under the 
inquiry procedure. To date, the two other treaty bodies have conducted 
inquiries. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
12
 
which has only conducted two inquiries, in the UK (impacts of welfare 
reform) and Spain (segregation in education)
13
 and the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child has released one report in Chile (residential 
protection).
14
 The remaining treaty bodies empowered to conduct 
inquiries—the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, the Committee 
on the Convention Against Torture and the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights—have not yet conducted any.15 At this early stage 
in the history of the inquiry procedure, it is pertinent to ask: what 
contribution have the inquiries from the CEDAW Committee made to 
reconceptualising accountability for systemic violations of human rights?  
                                           
9 (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13. 
10 An exception is Catherine O’Rourke, ‘Bridging the Enforcement Gap: Evaluating the 
Inquiry Procedure of the CEDAW Optional Protocol’ (2018) 27 American University 
Journal of Gender, Social Policy and Journal 1.  
11 Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW (adopted 6 October 1999, entered into 
force 22 December 2000) 2131 UNTS 83. 
12 Article 6 of the Optional Protocol to The Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) (13 December 2006, A/RES/61/106). 
13 CRPD Committee, ‘Report of the inquiry concerning the UK of CRPD Committee 
under article 6 of OP-CRPD’ (2017) CRPD/C/15/4; CRPD Committee, ‘Report of the 
inquiry concerning Spain of the CRPD Committee under article 6 of OP-CRPD’ (2018) 
CRPD/C/20/3. 
14 Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Informe de la investigación relacionada en Chile 
en virtud del artículo 13 OP-CRC relativo a un procedimiento de comunicaciones’ (2018) 
CRC/C/CHL/INQ/1 (available only in Spanish). 
15Article 20 of The Convention Against Torture (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into 
force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85; Article 33 of The Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearances (adopted 12 January 2007 UNGA Res 61/177); 
Article 11 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (5 March 2009 A/RES/63/117). 
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To answer this question, Section I begins by critically assessing why 
individualised, court-based models of accountability have struggled to 
address grave and systemic abuses of human rights. Section II transitions 
to the international plane; it canvasses the role of international human 
rights law in achieving accountability and contextualises the inquiry 
procedure under the Optional Protocol to CEDAW (OP-CEDAW). 
Section III investigates whether the inquiry procedures undertaken by the 
CEDAW Committee can overcome the obstacles identified in Section I. 
This careful reading of the inquiry reports reveals that the greatest strength 
of this accountability mechanism is a targeted assessment of a specific 
human rights issue. This intense focus results in a fine-grained analysis 
that: (i) grasps the underlying causes, cultural norms and oppressive 
structures that perpetuate severe and widespread human rights abuses and 
(ii) provides a basis for proposing recommendations that are designed to 
prevent future violations. As the CEDAW Committee and the other treaty 
bodies continue to develop the inquiry procedure, this article concludes 
by flagging areas for future consideration so that accountability forums 
speak to the realities of structural abuses.   
2. The Limits of Individualised Court-Based 
Accountability  
One of the most prominent forums in which to claim accountability for 
human rights violations is domestic courts. Court-based models of 
adjudication, especially in common law systems, are based on an 
individualised and adversarial conception of justice. At the outset, it is 
important to acknowledge there are diversities and exceptions within this 
model. As one example, public interest litigators in South Africa, Brazil, 
the US and India are using the traditional court process to secure systemic 
remedies beyond reparation for the individual.
16
 Although there are 
differences in the nature and scope of public interest litigation across 
different jurisdictions and human rights contexts, the common aim is to 
reform laws and institutions to achieve transformative aims.
17
 However, in 
                                           
16 Oxford Human Rights Hub, ‘Learning Lessons from Litigators: Realising the Right to 
Education Through Public Interest Lawyering’ 
<http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/media/browse/video/> accessed 19 March 2019. 
17 Charles R Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in 
Comparative Perspective (Chicago University Press 1998); Austin Sarat and Stuart 
Scheingold (eds), Cause Lawyering and the State in a Global Era (OUP 2001); Ann Skelton, 
‘Strategic Litigation Impacts: Equal Access to Quality Education’ (Open Society Foundations 
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the traditional paradigm, the individual instigates the claim and presents 
evidence to the court of the perpetrator’s blameworthiness. If the court 
concludes there has been a violation of the law, it orders some form of 
punishment to the perpetrator or reparations to the victim.
18
 This account 
of the traditional approach is both over-simplified and highly stylized, but 
is still a useful analytical device for assessing why individualised, court-
based models can often fail to comprehensively address entrenched 
human rights abuses. While acknowledging the differences between civil 
and criminal law proceedings, for the purposes of this section, 
‘individualised, court-based models’ includes criminal proceedings. This 
type of legal action is instigated by the state, but it is a highly individualised 
process. Furthermore, criminal courts are common adjudicative forums 
for gender-based violence, a pernicious form of structural abuse that 
features prominently in the inquiries of the CEDAW Committee.  
This section uses this stylized model to diagnosis the key blockages that 
exist in the ability of individualised, court-based forums to account for 
grave and systemic human rights violations. This is not designed to be an 
exhaustive assessment but rather seeks to map prominent factors that 
prevent claims from reaching the court and, for the claims that proceed, 
to pinpoint features within the justice system that work against systemic 
accountability. This forms the basis for the evaluation of the inquiry 
procedure’s ability to overcome these blockages in Section III.  
 
A. Crossing the Threshold 
 
The initial stumbling block is that grave and systemic human rights issues 
are not coming before courts. There is an intricate web of factors that 
explains this invisibility. As a starting point, individuals may lack 
knowledge of their rights and do not bring their claims to the attention of 
courts.
19
  
Statutes of limitation can bar claims regardless of their merit. This 
comes to the fore prominently in relation to historic sexual and physical 
assaults. Victims may require time to understand the nature of the offence. 
Legally imposed time limits can prevent these individuals from accessing 
justice. Numerous women have accused comedian Bill Cosby of sexual 
assault, but due to statutes of limitations only one claim proceeded to 
                                           
2017) <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/strategic-litigation-impacts-
education-20170322.pdf> accessed 29 January 2019. 
18Abram Chayes, ‘The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation’ (1976) 89 Harvard Law 
Review 1281, 1282-84.  
19 CEDAW Committee ‘General Recommendation No. 33 on women’s access to justice’ 
(2015) CEDAW/C/GC/33 [32]. 
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court.
20
 During the ‘Sixties Scoop’ in the 1960-70s, the Canadian 
government escalated its policy of removing Indigenous children from 
their families and into residential schools. In these schools, Indigenous 
children were physically and sexually abused. In the 1990s and 2000s, 
individuals tried to pursue claims against the state, the Catholic and 
Protestant church (who had operated many of these schools) and specific 
perpetrators, but many of their claims were time barred.
21
 The procedural 
aspects of individualised, court-based models can operate so as to prevent 
victims of serious and widespread human rights abuses from obtaining 
accountability. 
There may be gaps in legal protection making it impossible to use the 
law to obtain accountability for structural human rights issues. The UN 
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights observes that 
the ‘laws tend to reflect and reinforce the privileges and interests of the 
powerful’ and may not ‘recognize or prioritize [structural] abuses.’22 Not all 
jurisdictions criminalise marital rape or have legislation on workplace 
harassment.
23
 The informal labour market is routinely excluded from legal 
protection
24
 and informal workers rarely seek accountability in 
individualised, court-based forums.
25
 Domestic human rights instruments 
may not protect rights to education, housing, health or standard of living 
making it almost impossible to obtain accountability in traditional legal 
forums for severe and entrenched violations in these fields of life.      
Individual, court-based models are premised on identifying a specific 
victim and perpetrator. This requirement can exclude certain types of 
grave and systemic human rights claims. For instance, when challenging 
the failure to revise textbooks that negatively portray women, it is difficult 
to ‘identify particular victims over and above other women.’26 At the same 
time, violations of human rights may not originate in the failure of one 
                                           
20 Kyle Kim et al, ‘Bill Cosby: A 50 Year Chronicle of Accusations and Accomplishments’ 
(17 July 2017) The Los Angeles Times <http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-bill-
cosby-timeline-htmlstory.html> accessed 6 March 2018. 
21 Blackwater v Pliny [2005] 3 SCR 3 [2]-[4] (Canadian Supreme Court). 
22 UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, ‘Access to Justice (2012) 
A/67/278 [28]. 
23 World Bank, ‘Women, Business and the Law’ (World Bank, 2016) 22-3. 
24 Working Group on Discrimination Against Women, ‘Discrimination Against Women in 
Economic and Social Life’ (2013) A/HRC/26/39 [55]-[56]; Pahmhidzai Bamu-Chipunza, 
‘Extending Occupational Health and Safety Law to Informal Street Vendors in South Africa’ 
(2018) U of OxHRH J 61. 
25 CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 26 on migrant women workers’ 
(2008) CEDAW/C/GC/26 [21]. 
26  Andrew Byrnes and Jane Connors, ‘Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A 
Complaints Procedure for the Women’s Convention?’ (1995-1996) 21 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 679, 705. 
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person but be the result of a complex chain of failures making it both 
difficult and pointless to name a specific perpetrator.
27
 
If individuals pursue claims for grave and systemic violations of human 
rights in traditional adjudicative forums, this can place an enormous 
burden on their shoulders. The totality of these costs can act as a powerful 
disincentive to obtaining accountability. Court proceedings are notoriously 
slow, and individuals may have to wait a considerable amount time to have 
their claims adjudicated.
28
 There is an array of financial costs in bringing 
forward a human rights claim. These can range from filing fees to the costs 
of lawyers (particularly salient in an era of dwindling legal aid budgets) to 
the costs of collecting evidence. Proving entrenched human rights 
violations can be expensive as the individual often has to compile evidence 
to demonstrate the scale and magnitude of the claim.
29
 There is no 
guarantee that the individual will be able to recover these costs from the 
perpetrator. If the court orders costs, the individual must still front the 
costs of litigation before being reimbursed by the defendant after the 
litigation has concluded. 
There are also social costs. Individuals claiming violations of their 
human rights often face stigma, repercussions and professional and 
personal ostracism.
30
 Bringing a claim can have negative knock-on effects. 
Mandatory charging policies for gender-based violence increase the risk of 
state control via migration or child custody law in women’s lives, 
particularly for women with intersectional identities.
31
 If the allegation of 
gender-based violence proceeds it can require the individual to present 
intimate details of their lives to the adjudicator for public scrutiny.
32
 The 
criminal law’s emphasis on disclosure and cross-examination can leave 
individuals feeling re-victimized.
33
 Private rights of action for gender-based 
violence are, in theory, able to empower the individual as they have more 
control over the process, but there is evidence that individuals are reluctant 
                                           
27 Essop v Home Office [2017] UKSC 27 [9]; Sandra Fredman, ‘Breaking the Mould: 
Equality as a Proactive Duty’ (2011) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 263.  
28 R v Jordan (2016) 1 SCR 631 (Canadian Supreme Court). 
29 The European Court of Human Rights warned against requiring statistics in indirect 
discrimination cases; see DH v Czech Republic (Application No 57325/00). 
30‘General Recommendation No. 33’ (n 19) [9], [25(a)(ii)].  
31 Linda Mills, Insult to Injury: Rethinking Our Response to Intimate Abuse (PUP 2013); 
Donna Coker, ‘Race, Poverty and the Crime-Centered Response to Domestic Violence’ 
(2004) 10 (11) Violence Against Women 1331, 1333. 
32 Fiona E Raitt, ‘Disclosure of Records and Privacy Rights in Rape Cases’ (2011) 15(1) 
Edinburgh Law Review 33. 
33Jacqueline M Wheatcroft et al, ‘Revictimizing the Victim? How Rape Victims Experience 
the UK Legal System’ (2009) 4(3) International Journal of Evidence-Based Research, Policy 
and Practice 265. 
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to re-engage with an abuser.
34
 The totality of these financial and social costs 
can simply be too great, meaning that individuals decide not to pursue a 
claim.  
Practical hurdles and procedural rules can make it difficult for 
individuals to come together to overcome these burdens as a group. 
Domestic workers who work in private homes are isolated from each 
other, making it hard to organise and pursue collective action.
35
 Class 
actions rules can be narrowly drawn, circumscribing the ability of 
individuals jointly to pursue structural human rights abuses.
36
 The rules of 
standing can limit CSOs’ role in legal processes or the rules on cost orders 
can create strong disincentives to their participation.
37
 
 
B. Within the Courtroom 
 
Combined, these obstacles can result in an ad-hoc array of grave and 
systemic issues coming before individualised, court-based forums. If a 
claim can overcome the hurdles detailed above and make it on the court 
docket, there is a further range of factors that can create blockages in 
achieving accountability.  
The traditional justice system may be riddled with myths, stereotypes 
and biased assumptions. The rules of evidence can be discriminatory. In 
some states, women need to corroborate their testimony ‘requiring them 
to discharge a higher burden of proof than men in order to establish an 
offense.’38 Prosecutors and judges, rather than being neutral arbitrators, 
can perpetuate dangerous stereotypes. A judge in Quebec, Canada, said a 
seventeen-year-old girl may have been a bit flattered by sexual 
harassment;
39
 another judge in Canada asked why an Indigenous woman 
just didn’t keep her knees together during a sexual assault.40 In the UK, 
                                           
34 Julie Goldschied, ‘Elusive Equality in Domestic and Sexual Violence Law Reform’ (2007) 
34 Florida State University Law Review 731. 
35 International Labour Organization, ‘Domestic Workers Around the World’ (ILO, 2013) 
50.  
36 David Marcus, ‘The Public Interest Class Action’ (2015) 104 Georgetown Law Journal 
789-95.  
37 See proposed reforms in the UK: Ministry of Justice ‘Judicial Review: Proposals for 
Further Reforms’ (2013) CM 8703 22-7; and Sections 88 to 90 of the Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act 2015 (UK) on cost orders. 
38 ‘General Recommendation No. 33’ (n 19) [25(a)(iii)]. 
39 CBC News, ‘Justice Minister Denounces Judge’s Comments on Teen Sexual Assault 
Victim’s Weight’ (25 October 201) CBC <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-
court-judge-sexual-assault-victim-1.4370997> accessed 9 January 2018.  
40 Sean Fine, ‘Judges in “knees together” trial resigns after council recommends he be 
fired’ (9 March 2017) The Globe and Mail 
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/judicial-council-recommends-justice-
robin-camp-be-fired/article34249312/> accessed 9 January 2018. 
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there is similar evidence that, despite legal protections against the use of 
rape myths, prosecutors and judges are not objecting to them being relied 
upon in sexual assault trials.
41
 The Lammy Report found that Black, Asian  
and Minority Ethnic women in the UK are more likely to be found guilty 
by magistrates than white women.
42
 The US Supreme Court recently 
overturned a death sentence as there was evidence that the jury convicted 
the accused based on racist stereotypes.
43
 These are a handful of 
illustrations of a deeply engrained problem. Decision-makers may 
misunderstand the law and are often insensitive to the reality of human 
rights abuses.  
There are two further inter-related challenges to using individualised, 
court-based adjudicative forums to redress grave and systemic human 
rights abuses. First, the legal proceedings may have a different aim. The 
goal of proceedings is not to evaluate systemic human rights issues. The 
Supreme Court of Canada noted that courts are ‘adjudicators of the 
particular claim that is before it’ not a public inquiry investigating the 
systemic issues raised by the claim.
44
 This is most pronounced in using 
criminal law to redress human rights abuses, such as gender-based 
violence, as it is a highly individualised and decontextualized process.
45
 
The purpose of the criminal trial is to determine the guilt of the individual 
accused. It is not the role of the court to engage in assessing or remedying 
how patriarchal norms and structures contribute to gender-based violence 
or to evaluate the failures of the police in investigating violence against 
women. Criminal law pays little regard to the complex relationship 
between violence, gender, race, socio-economic class and migration status 
in maintaining women’s subordination.46 This lack of attention can result 
in the perpetuation of structural human rights abuses. There is evidence 
that criminal law can reproduce racial injustices;
47
 rob women of their voice 
and ignore their different needs;
48
 and penalise women, disproportionately 
                                           
41 Jennifer Temkin et al, ‘Different Functions of Rape Myth Use in Court: Findings from a 
Trial Observation Study’ (2018) 13(2) Feminist Criminology 205.   
42 ‘The Lammy Review: An independent review into the treatment of Black, Asian and 
Minority Ethnic Individuals in the Criminal Justice System’ (2017) 32 (UK) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/lammy-review-final-report> accessed 6 March 
2018. 
43 Pena-Rodriguez v Colorado, US 580__(2017) (US Supreme Court). 
44 Moore v British Columbia (Education) [2012] 3 SCR 360 (Canadian Supreme Court) 
(emphasis added) [63], [64]. 
45 Karen Engle, ‘Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights’ (2015) 
Cornell Law Review 1070. 
46  Aya Gruber, ‘A “Neo-Feminist” Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law 
Reform’ (2012) 15 Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 583. 
47 Bennett Capers, ‘The Unintentional Rapist’ (2010) Washington University Law Review 
1345. 
48 Mills (n 31). 
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those with intersectional identities, who do not cooperate with 
prosecutorial demands.
49
 By their institutional design, courts are often 
unable to grapple with the underlying structural human rights issues that 
connect each individual claim. This is not to argue that individualised court 
proceedings should be abandoned. When used in a reflective manner they 
can serve an important function. Rather, accountability needs to be 
harmoniously multi-faceted.  
Second, can an individual claim be fully emblematic of structural 
human rights issues?
50
 It may be readily apparent, or become apparent as 
the claim unfolds, that the individual’s human rights issue is connected to 
gross, deeply embedded and widespread violations.
51
 But, can one claim 
reveal the full picture of structures, institutions, systems, history, beliefs 
and attitudes that explain the individual human rights violation? Are there 
inevitable blind-spots in using an individual claim to redress larger human 
rights issues? The insights from intersectionality theory serve as a caution. 
Intersectionality warns of the danger of equating, for example, all women’s 
experiences with the experience of white, middle-class, able-bodied, 
heterosexual women who live in the developed world.
52
 Different identities 
will impact upon and shape the nature of human rights claims. Examining 
structures through the lens of an individualised experience raises questions 
on the ability of the court to see, and take account of, how differently 
situated individuals experience human rights violations. The aim here is 
not to answer this tough question but simply to flag that individualized 
accountability forums may not grasp the full picture. 
A final complication is that remedies from individualised, court-based 
forums are traditionally backward-looking and individualised. The 
classical understanding is that ‘justice can only be done for individuals 
before the court and not for larger groups.’53 It is usually achieved through 
immediate monetary remedial compensation or, in the case of criminal 
law, an individualised sentence.
54
 A consequence of the court ordered 
corrective, individualised remedy may be to reform ‘large public 
                                           
49 Meghan Condon, ‘Bruise of a Different Color: The Possibilities of Restorative Justice for 
Minority Victims of Domestic Violence’ (2010) 17 Georgetown Journal on Poverty, Law and 
Policy 487.  
50 Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, ICCPR: Cases, Materials and Commentary 2nd ed 
(OUP 2013) 817-18. 
51 Byrnes and Connor (n 26) 750-52. 
52Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalising the Intersection of Race and Sex’ (1989) University 
of Chicago Legal Forum 139. 
53  Kent Roach, ‘The Challenges of Crafting Remedies for Socio-Economic Rights’ in 
Malcolm Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law (CUP 2008) 48. 
54 ibid; Julie Goldscheid and Rene Kathawala, ‘State Civil Rights Remedies for Gender 
Violence: A Tool for Accountability’ (2018) 87 University of Cincinnati Law Review 171, 
199-200. 
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bureaucracies…new legislation or governmental programs’ or shift cultural 
attitudes, but that is not the central goal of the remedy.
55
 Remedies are 
limited due to concerns about the role and expertise of courts. There is a 
fear that courts do not have the requisite knowledge to order widespread 
structural reform, especially when it has budgetary implications.
56
 
Furthermore, there is often no single solution to grave and systemic human 
rights violations. There are a range of remedies. It is argued that courts do 
not have the democratic mandate to make that remedial choice.
57
 Out of 
fears of micro-managing the government and overstepping their role in the 
separation of powers, remedies are narrowly tailored.
58
 Without remedies 
targeted at the grave and systemic abuses, courts can fail to make rights 
real. There is widespread acknowledgement of this problem. Courts all 
over the world, at the domestic and regional level, are responding to it and 
pushing against the classic conception of remedies.
59
 There are debates on 
whether courts are able effectively to achieve structural change,
60
 but the 
ability of courts to grapple with systemic abuses is forestalled when the 
traditional remedial process does not even begin to examine the larger 
context raised by an individualised claim.  
Not every factor detailed in this section may arise in every national 
context. Certain issues may be more prominent while others may not be 
relevant. A selective mix of factors might be at play in different states or in 
relation to different human rights issues. Nor are these factors exhaustive. 
New factual matrices can bring to the fore new complications in using 
individualised, court-based forums to achieve accountability for 
widespread and serious human rights violations. Even with these caveats, 
this section does offer explanations as to why traditional accountability 
forums struggle to understand and remedy structural human rights claims. 
There are efforts to reform the law and court proceedings and to establish 
new models for accountability.
61
 The next section investigates the role of 
international human rights in these efforts and the promise of the inquiry 
procedure.     
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3. Giving Voice to the Voiceless: International 
Human Rights Law 
What role does the international human rights system—specifically the 
inquiry procedure under the OP-CEDAW—play in accountability for 
grave and systemic human rights abuses? This section provides a 
contextual understanding on the broad goals of accountability under the 
international human rights system and the history of the inquiry procedure 
under the OP-CEDAW.  
 
A. Accountability on the International Plane 
 
By signifying and ratifying UN human rights treaties, states have consented 
to being held accountable on the international plane. Treaty bodies are 
not judicial bodies.
62
 They are a geographically diverse body of experts that 
monitor the state’s implementation of treaty obligations. 63 They do not 
issue binding interpretations of the treaty nor do they have the power to 
enforce remedial orders. Treaty bodies are not ‘courts to which appeals 
may be taken from a state’s highest domestic court.’ 64  Their role in 
accountability needs to be understood in light of the different nature of the 
international human rights system.  
Treaty bodies’ accountability relies on strength of reasoning. First, as 
argued in Section I, domestic human rights protection may be incomplete 
or inadequate. The UN treaty bodies can be used to draw attention to 
human rights issues that are neglected in domestic forums. It is hoped that 
shining the international spotlight on an issue will prompt the state to 
undertake human rights reforms. This can be successful. The Human 
Rights Committee, which monitors the implementation of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, concluded in Toonen 
v Australia that sodomy laws violated the individual’s right to privacy.65 The 
Australian government positively responded to the decision by passing the 
Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994 legalising same-sex sexual 
activity.
66
 Second, the treaty bodies share best practice and provide 
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guidance to states on how to fully implement their treaty obligations.
67
 
Third, treaty bodies seek to deepen the understanding of open-textured 
human rights.
68
 This work is not legally binding, but the standards 
developed at the international level can and do influence CSOs, courts, 
policy-makers and legislators.
69
 The CEDAW Committee’s work on 
gender-based violence has been cited by numerous apex courts and used 
as a model for domestic legislation.
70
 In an insightful study on the 
relationship between treaty bodies and domestic courts, Kanetake 
demonstrates that courts in the UK, Canada, Australia, Bangladesh, 
Kenya, Switzerland, Peru, Germany, Belize, The Netherlands and Spain 
have drawn on the findings of treaty bodies.
71
  
There is no guaranteed route to achieving the accountability goals of 
international human rights law and there are as many successes as failures.
72
 
The different character of international human rights accountability means 
there is no competition between domestic and international forums on 
which body is better able to take account of structural human rights issues. 
The interaction between international and domestic forums needs to be 
complementary. The question explored in Section III is how a relatively 
new accountability mechanism, the inquiry procedure under the OP-
CEDAW, can provide guidance on redressing grave and systemic abuses 
of human rights.    
 
B. Accountability under the OP-CEDAW  
 
Before answering this question, this section concludes by canvassing the 
history of the OP-CEDAW. Almost immediately upon coming into force, 
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there were concerns that CEDAW was a second-class instrument.
73
 Unlike 
some other UN treaties, it did not have an individual right of petition or 
an inquiry procedure. The absence of these remedial mechanisms was 
viewed as a weakness.
74
 The extent of this weakness can be seen by 
examining CEDAW’s central accountability mechanism: the periodic 
reporting process. Under this process, the CEDAW Committee reviews 
the state’s efforts to implement the treaty, identifies areas of concern and 
provides recommendations on how the state can accelerate its effort to 
achieve gender equality. This process is heavily dependent on the state 
providing information to the CEDAW Committee. Unsurprisingly, states, 
for a multitude of reasons, do not consistently submit their reports on time 
nor do they always provide a critical assessment of gender inequality.
75
 This 
factual gap has partially been filled by shadow reports of CSOs. Civil 
society, however, can have its own agenda and may focus on some specific 
issues at the expense of others.
76
 The CEDAW Committee is not 
empowered to supplement any bias in reporting through its own fact-
finding missions. The periodic reporting process does have strengths and 
remains a cornerstone mechanism, but exclusively relying on it for 
accountability results in an incomplete picture. Since the 1980s, there was 
a desire to strengthen accountability under CEDAW. The feeling was that 
the CEDAW Committee should not be overly dependent on states and 
should itself be empowered to grapple with the many different facets of 
gender inequality.
77
 Throughout the 1990s, the UN Division for the 
Advancement of Women, the CEDAW Committee, CSOs and 
academics campaigned for an optional protocol. This process culminated 
in the OP-CEDAW in 2000.  
Examining the drafting history of the OP-CEDAW provides clarity on 
the aims of the inquiry procedure. It was proposed that, upon receipt of 
reliable information into grievous or widespread abuses of CEDAW, the 
CEDAW Committee should engage in dialogue with the state about the 
allegations and, if required, proceed to conduct an inquiry which could 
include a fact-finding visit to the state.
78
 The majority of states were in 
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favour of the inquiry procedures but there were states in opposition.
79
 
Those in support of the inquiry hoped that it would ‘facilitate the 
examination of widespread violations, including those that crossed 
national borders.’ 80 It was also hoped that the inquiries could have an 
educational effect by exposing the root causes of discrimination against 
women.
81
 Increasing attention to systemic gender inequality ‘would 
[hopefully] contribute to the integration of the human rights of women 
throughout the UN system.’ 82 Supporters felt the inquiries could fill an 
accountability gap ‘in cases where individual women who had suffered over 
and above other women could not be identified’ 83 and ‘protect women 
from reprisal or practical constraints on their ability’ to bring claims.84  
States in opposition were concerned that the inquiry procedure could 
undermine state sovereignty and there was debate on the threshold criteria 
for initiating an inquiry.
85
 Some states felt that there was a difference 
between serious crimes (racial discrimination) and the elimination of 
discrimination against women, such that it would be inappropriate to set 
up a ‘court of judgment’ under CEDAW.86 The academic community was 
strongly in favour of an inquiry procedure, but had concerns that it might 
tax the limited resources of the CEDAW Committee, needlessly replicate 
existing accountability mechanisms and expose the CEDAW Committee 
to ‘selectivity and political bias.’87  
The effect of these debates can be seen in the text of the OP-CEDAW. 
Under Article 8(1), an inquiry procedure may be initiated if the CEDAW 
Committee receives reliable information that CEDAW has been 
grievously and systematically violated. Under the rules of procedure, the 
CEDAW Committee can ascertain the veracity of information
88
 by 
examining ‘its consistency, corroborating evidence, the credibility of its 
source and information from other sources, national or international, 
official or non-official.’89 The state has an initial opportunity to respond 
(Article 8(1)). The CEDAW Committee considers all this information 
when deciding to conduct an inquiry which may include a state visit (Article 
8(2)). The state has a right to receive the Committee’s findings and 
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recommendations (Article 8(3)); has six months to respond (Article 8(4)); 
and the response should detail the steps it has taken as a result of the 
inquiry findings (Article 9(1)). The entire inquiry ‘shall be conducted 
confidentially and the cooperation of the State Party shall be sought at all 
stages’ (Article 8(6)). States are permitted to opt out of the inquiry 
procedure under Article 10.
90
 Only four states have opted out.
91
  
As of April 2019, the CEDAW Committee has conducted five 
inquiries: into murdered and missing women in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico;
92
 
murdered and missing Indigenous women in Canada;
93
 access to modern 
contraception in Manila, The Philippines;
94
 access to abortion in Northern 
Ireland;
95
 and bride-kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan.
96
 For the five inquiries, the 
CEDAW Committee undertook fact-finding missions. In all five inquiries, 
there had been grave and systemic violations of CEDAW and all states, 
besides The Philippines, have provided a written response. The limited 
use of the inquiry procedure may be due to CSOs and the CEDAW 
Committee’s ‘reticence to publicly activate the procedure’. 97  These 
decisions have largely been ignored in the discourse on OP-CEDAW. 
4. Re-Imagining Accountability for Grave and 
Systemic Human Rights Abuses 
The drafters of the OP-CEDAW had a bold vision for the inquiry 
procedure—grappling with the root causes of discrimination against 
women, redressing gender inequalities that do not fit within the traditional 
remedial paradigm and alleviating the burdens that prevent women from 
seeking accountability.
98
 Have these goals been realized? Are the inquiry 
procedures able to take account of grave and systemic human rights 
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abuses? This section analyses the five inquiries against the central 
blockages identified in Section I. It begins by canvassing how the inquiry 
procedure can redress obstacles that prevent claims from proceeding and 
then investigates if the reasoning and remedial process in the inquiry 
procedure confronts grave and systemic human rights abuses. This analysis 
reveals the multiple strengths of the inquiry procedure. The institutional 
design, particularly the active role provided for CSOs and the CEDAW 
Committee, means that human rights abuses do not go unchallenged 
because of costs or technical legal rules. The intense focus on one specific 
grave and systemic issue sheds light on the embedded and interwoven 
structures and attitudes that underpin endemic human rights violations. In 
turn, this gives the CEDAW Committee a strong basis on which to 
propose targeted recommendations to prevent further violations. A careful 
reading of the inquiries also identifies areas for reflection and future 
reform.  
 
A. Out of the Shadows: Procedural Innovation under 
the Inquiry Procedure   
 
1. Overcoming Knowledge Gaps 
 
The inquiry procedure enables CSOs to instigate the inquiries, 
overcoming to a certain extent, the lack of awareness individuals may have 
about their rights. In all five inquires, it is CSOs that lodged concerns with 
the CEDAW Committee. At the drafting table, it was hoped that CSOs 
would be able to bring forward claims for vulnerable women who lacked 
legal literacy and knowledge of the human rights framework.
99
 It is difficult 
to evaluate whether this aim has fully materialised. For all five inquiry 
procedures, there was no indication that the CEDAW Committee 
members met with individuals who were previously unaware of their rights. 
The confidentiality of the inquiry process makes ‘it difficult to track, in 
detail, the work’ of the CEDAW Committee.
100
 In all five inquiries 
domestic legal proceedings challenged gender-based violence (Mexico, 
Canada and Kyrgyzstan)
101
 and restrictions on sexual and reproductive 
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health rights (The Philippines and Northern Ireland),
102
 implying that 
there was knowledge of the human rights claim. There may still have been 
individuals affected by gender-based violence or the restrictions on 
contraception and abortion who were unaware of their rights. In theory, 
the CSOs could direct the CEDAW Committee to consult with these 
women during the fact-finding mission. The promise still holds that any 
individualised knowledge gaps that might exist can be overcome by 
creating a prominent space for CSOs in accountability process. For future 
inquiry procedures, the CEDAW Committee should endeavour, where 
possible, to engage with women who have not been aware that their human 
rights have been violated. 
As all five inquiries were instigated by CSOs, it is pertinent to critically 
reflect on their role in accountability for human rights. Do the concerns of 
CSOs cluster around certain types of grave and systemic issues whilst 
ignoring other serious violations of human rights? Public interest litigation 
has been critiqued for being co-opted by an elite group of CSOs that are 
more concerned with advancing their own agenda.
103
 How can the inquiry 
procedure ensure it addresses the panoply of grave and systemic issues? 
These challenges raise questions about creating accountability processes at 
the UN, that are not reliant on CSOs, and providing support for local 
grassroots CSOs in the international human rights law system. There are 
no easy solutions, but this is an issue that requires attention as the inquiry 
procedure continues to develop.     
 
2. Beyond Time Limits  
 
The inquiry procedure adopts a fluid approach to time limits that seeks to 
understand the relationship between past events and current violations of 
human rights. This fluid approach, however, still respects the principles of 
international law. Akin to statutes of limitations in domestic jurisdictions, 
international treaties do not have retroactive effect unless states manifest a 
different intention.
104
 There is no indication in the text of the OP-CEDAW 
that it is meant to apply retroactively. The basis for claims under the 
individual communications and inquiry procedures must be for violations 
of CEDAW that occurred after the OP-CEDAW came into force in 2003. 
Individual communications have been defeated on this basis.
105
 Under the 
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inquiry procedure, the CEDAW Committee took a different account of 
the passage of time. It did not draw ‘an arbitrary historical borderline 
between events occurring before and after’ the coming into force of the 
OP-CEDAW.
106
 In evaluating the disproportionate levels of violence 
against Indigenous women in Canada, both the CEDAW Committee and 
the state ‘acknowledged that the past must be understood for its effect on 
the current situation.’
107
 This acknowledgment manifests in two ways. First, 
the CEDAW Committee took account of the history of Indigenous people 
in Canada and the state’s colonial policies so as to understand the root 
causes of current violence against Indigenous women. Second, it 
considered ‘the continuing effects of the cases of missing and murdered 
women that occurred before 2003,’ such as the poor quality of 
investigations and the long-term impact on families.
108
 Similarly, the 
CEDAW Committee linked the rise of bride-kidnapping to the collapse 
of the USSR and ‘a “lost generation” of Kyrgyz men who sought 
reaffirmation of their masculinity’ through bride-kidnapping.
109
 Moving 
away from a strict application of time limits allows the adjudicative forum 
to understand factors from the past that contribute to contemporary grave 
and systemic abuses and to assess the on-going effects of past violations 
while still only holding states accountable for incidences that happened 
after 2003.   
 
3. Comprehensive Approach to Human Rights 
 
One of the greatest strengths of the international human rights system, 
particularly of CEDAW, is its comprehensive approach to human rights. 
CEDAW requires states to take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination in all fields of life.
110
 In one instrument it protects civil, 
political and socio-economic rights and rights within the family. CEDAW 
and the CEDAW Committee’s transformative approach to equality and 
non-discrimination is canvased below. The focus here is on the scope of 
human rights protection and its impact on accountability for grave and 
systemic human rights abuses. The CEDAW Committee interprets the 
treaty in an evolutionary manner. It addresses the gendered dimensions of 
issues to which CEDAW does not explicitly refer, including the effects of 
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intersectionality, migration and climate change.
111
 In doing so, it anticipates 
‘the emergence of new forms of discrimination that had not been identified 
at the time of drafting.’
112
 There are notable gaps in CEDAW, for instance 
there are no obligations in the text on gender-based violence, gender-based 
poverty or sexual orientation and gender identity. The CEDAW 
Committee’s evolutionary interpretation has, to varying degrees, overcome 
these gaps.
113
 While not perfect, it is attentive to the stubborn and emerging 
ways that women’s rights are violated. If a domestic system does not offer 
legal recourse for accountability for certain types of structural human rights 
issues, the comprehensive and evolutionary obligations in CEDAW offer 
a route to accountability.  
This potential is best exemplified in The Philippines inquiry. Many 
domestic jurisdictions contain no right to access contraception. There may 
not be an obvious legal route to bring this claim before domestic 
accountability forums. Or the claim must be argued through the lens of 
other human rights and aspects of the claim might remain invisible. 
CEDAW does have provisions on family planning and control of 
reproduction.
114
 It uses these provisions to demonstrate that depriving 
women of contraception is harmful. By squarely examining the denial of 
the right to access contraception, the CEDAW Committee emphasized 
how it harms sexual and reproductive health. At the same time, the 
comprehensive approach to women’s rights embodied in the text of 
CEDAW directs the CEDAW Committee to analyse the claim from 
multiple legal perspectives which reveal the interlaced and often unseen 
facets of the human rights violation. In Northern Ireland, the CEDAW 
Committee evaluated abortion through the lens of multiple human rights, 
including negative cultural norms, a right to health, family planning, 
education and equality for rural women. O’Rourke is worried that the 
CEDAW Committee’s inquiries do not tap into the strengths of CEDAW 
and comprehensively assess the multiple legal rights raised by specific 
issue. She is particularly concerned that the inquiries into gender-based 
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violence (Canada and Mexico) disproportionately focus on civil and 
political rights at the expense of socio-economic rights.
115
 This criticism is 
misplaced. In the inquiry in Canada, the CEDAW Committee  forcefully 
concluded that the lack of education (Article 10 of CEDAW), 
employment opportunities (Article 11 of CEDAW) and transportation in 
rural areas (Article 14 of CEDAW); substance abuse issues (Article 12 of 
CEDAW); high rate of exploitative prostitution (Article 6 of CEDAW); 
and the disproportionate numbers of Indigenous children in the child 
welfare system (Article 16 of CEDAW) substantially increased Indigenous 
women’s risk of violence.
116
 There is similar sensitivity to the interaction 
between gender-based violence and socio-economic rights for inquiry in 
Mexico.
117
  
 
4. Chains of Institutions  
 
In the five inquiries, the CEDAW Committee investigates the chains and 
layers of actors and institutions that contributed to the failure to achieve 
gender equality. In looking at the high rates of violence in Ciudad Juárez, 
Mexico, the CEDAW Committee examined migration patterns, wealth 
inequality, the rise of organised crime, poor labour practices, inadequate 
public services and the incompetence and, arguably, complicity of police 
forces.
118
 For the inquiry into missing and murdered Indigenous women in 
Canada, the CEDAW Committee evaluated the role of social welfare 
schemes, the law on prostitution, child protection agencies, highway 
infrastructure and the lack of housing on Indigenous land reserves.
119
 In 
pinpointing the failure of the police, it examined, in detail, racist and sexist 
attitudes, missing person policies, the lack of coordinated communication 
between policies forces in different provinces and the inadequate 
collection of data.
120
 In The Philippines, the CEDAW Committee 
examined the decentralisation of the health care system and the delays in 
domestic justice procedures.
121
 In Northern Ireland, the CEDAW 
Committee assessed devolution in the UK; the chilling effect of the law on 
the medical community; the lack of public services in rural areas and the 
strategies of pro-life campaign groups.
122
 Lastly in the Kyrgyzstan, the 
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CEDAW Committee interrogated gender stereotypes that negatively 
impact the enforcement of the law, the burden of  evidentiary rules in 
criminal prosecutions and the non-registration of religious marriages.
123
 
Rather than attempting to identify a single, specific perpetrator, the 
CEDAW Committee evaluated the complex web of legal frameworks, 
institutions and actors that played a role in human rights violations.  
 
5. Shifting Burdens  
 
The inquiry procedures shift the financial and personal costs of 
accountability to actors in a better position to bear these burdens rather 
than requiring one person to absorb these costs. No one individual in the 
inquiry need worry about legal fees or the expense of collecting evidence 
of the systemic human rights violations. The CEDAW Committee 
undertakes these costs. There are concerns that treaty bodies do not have 
adequate budgetary support, but in comparison to individuals they are 
well-placed to shoulder these costs. The personal costs—stigmas, 
repercussions, invasions of privacy—that can deter individuals, especially 
women, from seeking accountability are also mitigated under the inquiry 
procedure. Unlike mandatory charging policies, (the obligation to lay 
charges if the police believe there has been an incident of gender-based 
violence), the CEDAW Committee did not mandate any women to 
pursue any particular legal response to a violation of her rights. It is also 
possible to trace a shift in the CEDAW Committee’s approach to 
mitigating the social costs of accountability. In the first inquiry in Mexico, 
the report named the murdered women and their family members.
124
 This 
is disconcerting as the report stressed there had been increased threats 
directed towards victim’s families.
125
 There may have been strategic 
reasons for naming the victims as the levels of violence in Mexico were 
ignored and women literally and figuratively disappear.
126
 Naming 
murdered women could be a powerful statement. Due to the 
confidentiality requirements, there was no record of the CEDAW 
Committee’s motives or of any repercussions towards the individuals 
named in the report. Strikingly, in comparison, no individuals were named 
in the reports from Canada, The Philippines, Northern Ireland and 
Kyrgyzstan. The high levels of stigma against victims of bride-kidnapping 
operated to silence women and deny them justice.
127
 In dialoguing with 
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individuals, the CEDAW Committee only identified women in the 
footnotes as ‘Victim X’ or ‘Victim H’.  The inquiries accordingly created 
a private space to share experiences and details of human rights violations 
while simultaneously being a public forum.  
One final procedural aspect needs to be analysed, which points to 
future developments around the inquiry procedure. Domestic 
proceedings are notorious for delay and the inquiry procedure also suffers 
from this problem. From the initial submission to the CEDAW 
Committee to the release of the final report, the Mexico inquiry took three 
years; the investigation in Canada took four years and the inquiries for The 
Philippines and Northern Ireland lasted eight and seven years respectively. 
The latest report from Kyrgyzstan took five years to complete. The delays 
in producing inquiry reports suggest that the CEDAW Committee was not 
properly supported in undertaking these inquiries. This confirms the fears 
of the academic community at the outset of the OP-CEDAW. While the 
delays reveal glimpses into the need for reform within the UN human 
rights system, this should not be read as a call to abandon the inquiry 
procedure. Sadly, the eight years it took to undertake the inquiry 
procedure in The Philippines was still faster than obtaining accountability 
in the Filipino courts. A domestic legal challenge to the ban was still 
working its way through the courts in 2015 when the CEDAW 
Committee’s inquiry report was released. Even an imperfect system has 
considerable strengths and the current delays should inspire further 
discussions on treaty body reform and overall support for the UN human 
rights system. 
   
B. Centre Stage: Engaging with Grave and Systemic 
Abuses in the Inquiry Procedure  
 
The design of the inquiry procedure, in theory and practice, facilitated 
accountability for grave and systemic abuses that often struggle to access 
justice in traditional domestic settings. Examining the CEDAW 
Committee’s reasoning in the final reports demonstrated a further strength 
of the inquiry procedure. The CEDAW Committee’s expertise combined 
with an exclusive focus on one specific aspect of human rights means that 
the inquiry procedure could uncover the laws, norms and institutions that 
underpin severe and widespread abuses. In turn, the CEDAW Committee 
could propose recommendations that are programmatic and future 
oriented. This final subsection analyses the CEDAW Committee’s 
reasoning and recommendations in the reports to assess its ability to 
engage squarely with grave and systemic human rights violations.       
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1. Expertise in Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination  
 
The expertise of the CEDAW Committee could be a powerful tool to 
dismantle disadvantage, bias and stereotypes. There are concerns that 
domestic justice officials lack the expertise on equality, non-discrimination 
and human rights necessary to ensure accountability. The CEDAW 
Committee, on the other hand, consists of twenty-three individuals who 
are specifically appointed for their expertise in gender equality. This 
expertise is needed as the concept of equality and non-discrimination in 
CEDAW differs from many national and regional equality protections. 
CEDAW prohibits sex/gender discrimination against women. It is 
designed to be asymmetrical as it recognises that ‘it is mostly women who 
suffer from discrimination on the grounds of their sex.’
128
 It also has 
unique provisions on gender equality: Article 4 requires states to take 
temporary special measures to achieve gender equality; Article 5 holds that 
states must modify negative cultural attitudes based on women’s inferiority 
and Article 14 guarantees gender equality for rural women. These 
provisions reflect the rich and varied concept of equality in CEDAW. The 
treaty includes aspects of formal equality, equality of opportunity and 
results and transformative equality.
129
 The analysis in this subsection uses 
transformative equality to evaluate the expertise of the CEDAW 
Committee and its reasoning in the five inquiries as it is the model of 
equality in CEDAW geared towards uncovering unequal structures. There 
are overlapping definitions of transformative equality.
130
 Fredman’s four 
dimensional model is used as it has been influential at the UN.
131
 
Transformative gender equality must break cycles of disadvantage; 
promote dignity by modifying harmful cultural attitudes and stereotypes; 
guarantee women’s political and social inclusion and transform 
institutions, systems and structures that perpetuate women’s inequality.
132
 
To what extent has the CEDAW Committee drawn on the transformative 
model of equality in undertaking inquiries into systemic and grave abuses?  
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The CEDAW Committee’s use of transformative equality both 
demonstrated the strength of the inquiry procedure and marked out areas 
for future developments. To varying degrees, the CEDAW Committee 
was attentive to the multiple dimensions of inequality. The first dimension, 
breaking cycles of disadvantage, directed the CEDAW Committee to 
understand how vulnerable and marginalised women experience human 
rights violations. In Northern Ireland, the CEDAW Committee pointed 
out that for rural, migrant, asylum seeking and refugee women, the limited 
availability of sexual and reproductive health services forced them into 
unsafe abortions.
133
All five inquiries identified a key aspect of 
disadvantage—gender-based poverty—in exacerbating the risk of gender-
based violence and limiting access to sexual and reproductive health 
services. The CEDAW Committee powerfully concluded that women in 
Mexico are ‘murdered because they are women and because they are 
poor.’
134
 In The Philippines, the contraception ban ‘had detrimental 
consequences for economically disadvantaged women and drove them 
further into poverty by depriving them of an opportunity to control the 
number and spacing of their children.’
135
 In Kyrgyzstan, the inquiry noted 
that women from low-income families or female-headed households are 
‘especially vulnerable to bride kidnapping.’
136
  
As to the second dimension, promoting dignity, the CEDAW 
Committee did not perpetuate gender stereotypes that are often found in 
domestic judicial systems, although there is space for greater engagement 
with harmful attitudes that undermine women’s equality. The 
intersectionality aspect of the recognition dimension is discussed further 
below. At the outset, it is important to flag that evaluating whether the 
inquiry procedures are free from bias is a difficult task. Due, at least in 
part, to confidentially requirements, there are no publicly available records 
for interviews with stakeholders or the CEDAW Committee’s internal 
deliberations. Historically, there is evidence that the CEDAW Committee 
members were influenced by the politics of the Cold War.
137
 Current geo-
political factors and attitudes of Committee members could seemingly also 
influence the inquiry. It is beyond the scope of this article to undertake an 
empirical investigation into potential biases within the treaty body. Taking 
the inquiry reports at face value, the CEDAW Committee is a champion 
for gender equality and is challenging rather than replicating biases.  
                                           
133 ‘Inquiry Procedure: Northern Ireland’ (n 95) [69]. 
134 ‘Inquiry Procedure: Mexico’ (n 92) [66]. 
135 ‘Inquiry Procedure: The Philippines’ (n 94) [41]. 
136 ‘Inquiry Procedure: Kyrgyzstan’ (n 96) [25].  
137 Elizabeth Evatt, Finding a Voice for Women’s Rights: The Early Days of CEDAW’ 
(2002-03) 34 George Washington International Law Review 515, 524. 
2019 University of Oxford Human Rights Hub Journal Vol. 1 
 80 
A few examples illustrate this point. It expressed concern that in 
Mexico and Canada officials blamed women for engaging in high risk 
behaviour.
138
 In Canada, the CEDAW Committee goes a step further and 
noted that the negative police attitudes towards women were intertwined 
with racist stereotypes.
139
 In The Philippines and Northern Ireland, the 
CEDAW Committee drew attention to stereotypes that essentialise 
women as mothers and ‘moral characterisations of abortion that reinforce 
stigma.’
140
 In Kyrgyzstan, the CEDAW Committee challenged gender 
stereotypes on masculinity that legitimized bride-kidnapping among 
families, religious leaders and justice officials and the victim shaming that 
punished women and ostracised them from their families.
141
 This may 
appear to be covering well-trodden ground, but states continue to deny the 
impact of negative stereotypes on women’s rights. In response to the 
inquiry in Northern Ireland, despite citing direct statements from the 
Attorney-General as evidence of negative attitudes to abortion, the UK 
government held that there was no factual basis to conclude that they failed 
to combat gender stereotypes.
142
  
There is a glaring example where the CEDAW Committee missed the 
recognition dimension gender equality. The inquiry in The Philippines 
hinted at the role of the Catholic Church in limiting access to modern 
contraception.
143
 Yet it did not give any significant attention to the role of 
religion and culture in undermining women’s sexual and reproductive 
health rights. This silence might be explained by background geo-politics, 
which are difficult to assess due to the confidentiality requirements under 
the OP-CEDAW. It does suggest, however, that there is space for the 
CEDAW Committee to employ its expertise more fully and interrogate all 
the recognition dimensions of the claim. 
The focus on systemic abuses lends itself to the third dimension, 
identifying structural barriers to gender equality and women’s human 
rights. In Mexico, Canada, The Philippines and Northern Ireland the 
inquiries stressed the negative impact of decentralising power from federal 
to  local authorities
144
 In Mexico and Canada, the CEDAW Committee 
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identified how the lack of investment in public services forced women into 
high risk situations (hitchhiking, prostitution, walking in dimly lit areas) 
and criticized the state’s fragmentary approach to violence and chronic 
mismanagement of investigations.
145
 The criminalisation of abortion in 
Northern Ireland perpetuated a black market in dangerous abortifacients; 
forced women to travel to England; and created a culture of silence on 
abortion that resulted in a lack of adequate post-abortion health care. For 
women who could not afford to travel for an abortion, there is virtually no 
state support for raising unplanned children.
146
 The lack of legal 
recognition of unregistered religious unions meant women in Kyrgyzstan, 
who are kidnapped and forced to marry in a religious ceremony, had no 
legal protection, including child support, when they leave the forced 
marriage.
147
 There are limited facilities in Kyrgyzstan to obtain the 
necessary forensic evidence to prosecute these crimes.
148
 Again, there are 
areas for further engagement with oppressive structures. Rourke is critical 
of the inquiry in The Philippines in that it does not sufficiently establish a 
right to safe and legal to abortion.
149
 This may be explained by the inquiry’s 
focus on access to contraception or, again, it might link to the relative 
silence on the role of religion in limiting women’s sexual and reproductive 
health rights.  
The final dimension, participation, is emphasised throughout the 
inquiries. The Canadian inquiry stressed the low rates of Indigenous 
women serving as police officers and as justice officials.
150
 And the 
Committee is highly critical that Filipino and Northern Irish women are 
denied a voice in the most intimate choices over their bodies.
151
 Together, 
CEDAW’s sophisticated concept of equality and non-discrimination and 
the CEDAW Committee’s expertise has resulted in a rich jurisprudence 
on women’s rights in the inquiry process that brings to the fore nuanced 
and structural inequalities. This analysis also exposes areas where the 
CEDAW Committee could more fully engage with sensitive aspects of 
equality and systemic human rights abuses.  
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2. Zoning in on Grave and Systemic Issues 
 
One of the strongest features of the inquiry procedure is its exclusive focus 
on grave and systemic human rights abuses. The grave component of the 
inquiry procedure is centred on ‘substantial harms’.
152
 In relation to 
murdered and missing Indigenous Women in Canada, the CEDAW 
Committee highlighted the ‘severe pain and suffering to relatives and 
communities.’
153
 In Kyrgyzstan, the CEDAW Committee noted that 
women had the deplorable choices of remaining in a forced marriage and 
risk being exposed to sexual violence, or escape the marriage and risk 
‘separation from their children, poverty and social isolation.’
154
 In 
Northern Ireland, the CEDAW Committee concluded that limiting access 
to abortion can condemn women to the ‘tortuous experience of being 
compelled to carry a [unwanted] pregnancy’,
155
 and in The Philippines the 
lack of contraception could become a matter of life and death.
156
 The 
systemic component of the inquiry maps the ‘significant and persistent 
pattern of acts that do not result from a random occurrence’.
157
 The 
CEDAW Committee expressed concern about a ‘culture of violence…that 
is based on women’s alleged inferiority’ (Mexico); the lack of coordinated 
responses to violence (Canada); the official and deliberate policy to ‘place 
certain ideology above the well-being of women’ (The Philippines); the 
deliberate retention of criminal laws (Northern Ireland) and the failure to 
enforce criminal law and implement programmes to change ‘persistent 
attitudes’ (Kyrgyzstan).
158
 Traditional court-based adjudicative forums 
often do not have a mandate or can only incidentally evaluate patterns of 
abuse. The inquiries, on the other hand, focus on the most severe human 
rights violations and on the interlocking and intricate patterns of 
oppression. 
 
3. Multiple Perspectives 
 
The design of the inquiry procedure permits the CEDAW Committee to 
examine the claim from multiple perspectives. In comparison, traditional 
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adversarial accountability processes are generally focused on the individual 
factual matrix. The court may not be able to grasp how differently situated 
individuals experience violence or restrictions on sexual and reproductive 
health. The inquiry procedure, on the other hand, takes a holistic 
approach to the claim. For the inquiry into Northern Ireland, the 
CEDAW Committee considered how the criminalisation of abortion 
impacted rural women, migrant women and women who live in poverty
159
 
and in Canada, the CEDAW Committee assessed the different 
circumstances for Indigenous women on- and off- land reserves.
160
 The 
attention to intra-group difference is linked to the fact-finding mission 
under the inquiry procedure and the CEDAW Committee member’s 
consultation with numerous stakeholders. Using Canada as an example, 
the CEDAW Committee members met with local and national 
government officials from various different government departments, 
members of the police service, lawyers, the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission, the Ombudsman for Victims of Crime, members of 
Parliament, representatives from national and regional indigenous 
organisations, indigenous women’s organisations, academics, services 
provides for indigenous people on- and off-reserve and forty family 
members of missing and murdered indigenous women.
161
 The CEDAW 
Committee engaged with a similarly wide array of actors when conducting 
state visits in Mexico, The Philippines, Northern Ireland and 
Kyrgyzstan.
162
 Its dialogues with numerous actors and individuals allowed 
the inquiry procedure to take account of a wide range of identities, factors 
and circumstances. This in turn provided a foundation for the CEDAW 
Committee’s appreciation of how these differences contributed to the 
experience of endemic and widespread human rights abuses.    
 
4. Systemic Remedies  
 
The remedies in the inquiry procedure are exclusively designed to redress 
multiple structures that perpetuate grave and systemic abuses. The 
recommendations start with addressing legal frameworks. Canada is urged 
to reform the law on prostitution and conduct a national inquiry into 
murdered and missing Indigenous women. The Philippines is encouraged 
to revoke the contraception bans and to monitor the health system; and 
Northern Ireland is directed to decriminalise abortion and expand the 
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grounds for legal abortion.
163
 The recommendations then shifted towards 
the specific aspect of gender inequality under review. For Mexico, Canada 
and Kyrgyzstan, the CEDAW Committee provided a series of 
recommendations directed at the justice system, including enhancing 
coordination between different judicial and governmental agencies; 
building trust between communities and the police; strengthening police 
complaints mechanisms and enhancing victim services.
164
 In Kyrgyzstan, 
the CEDAW Committee recommended the registration of religious 
marriages to ensure victims of bride-kidnapping are entitled to the 
protections of family law.
165
 The Philippines and Northern Ireland 
recommendations are targeted at the health system. The Philippines is 
encouraged to provide sufficient budgets so local government units that 
can provide affordable contraception and to redress lost institutional 
capacity due to the contraception ban.
166
 Northern Ireland is directed to 
provide usable guidance to health care professionals on legal abortion; to 
include sex education in the classroom; and to protect women from 
harassment by anti-abortion groups.
167
 Each inquiry also recommended 
that the state addresses larger cross-cutting structural factors such as socio-
economic conditions, cultural attitudes on women, access to justice and 
the negative effects of colonalisation and globalisation and increase the 
participation of women in decision making processes.  
The inquiry procedure overcomes the traditional remedial deficit as its 
recommendations are designed to transform cultural norms, structures 
and institutions. However, remedial mechanisms at international human 
rights law are never straightforward. The inquiry procedure can be 
critiqued for focusing on the structural at the expense of the individual. 
Domestic courts seeking to hold states to account for structural human 
rights abuses are increasingly adopting a two-track approach to remedies.
168
 
They are striving to find a balance between systemic remedies and the 
need for immediate individualised relief.
169
 No such balance is achieved 
through the inquiry procedure as individualised concrete relief is not 
offered. Does this mean the inquiry procedure risks losing sight of the 
realities of human rights experiences? These concerns are misguided. The 
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CEDAW Committee engaged in dialogue with numerous women and 
their family members who have experienced gross human rights violations. 
In reading the inquiry reports, what springs from the page is attention to 
the nuances of each woman’s experiences and the vivid portrait of the 
cruelty of grave and systemic human rights abuses. Furthermore, as 
discussed in Section II, the inquiry procedure needs to be understood as 
operating in harmony with domestic forums and other international 
mechanisms, such as individual communications, which operating 
together can provide both individualised and structural relief.       
5. Conclusion 
By shifting away from an individualised conception of accountability, the 
inquiry procedure can squarely confront accountability for grave and 
systemic human rights abuses. The inquiries adopt a relaxed and fluid 
approach to procedural rules and shift the burdens of pursuing 
accountability from the individual to actors more capable of bearing these 
costs. By focusing on the severity and magnitude of the human rights 
abuses, the CEDAW Committee can engage from a multi-faceted 
perspective with laws, policies, institutions, norms and actors that 
perpetuate human rights abuses. As a result, the CEDAW Committee’s 
recommendations are directed at remedying these endemic factors. The 
inquiry procedure can overcome many of the obstacles that exist to 
achieving accountability for grave and systemic abuses and can 
harmoniously complement domestic individualised accountability forums. 
The analysis in this article points the way forward for future reform 
including supporting local and grassroots CSOs and, providing the treaty 
bodies with the requisite human and financial resources to reduce the 
delays in conducting inquiries and, hopefully, will prompt the CEDAW 
Committee to address all aspects of the claim.   
The on-the-ground impact of the inquiry procedures is mixed. Despite 
numerous federal and local reforms, the rates of violence against women 
in Mexico remain alarmingly high.
170
 The public inquiry into missing and 
murdered indigenous women is bogged with delay.
171
 Although President 
Duterte of the Philippines has a problematic human rights record, he has 
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implemented Executive Order No 12 to ensure there is ‘zero unmet need 
for modern family planning.’
172
Abortion remains a criminal offence in 
Northern Ireland, although the UK government is taking steps to support 
Northern Irish women to obtain safe and affordable abortions in 
England.
173
 The government in Kyrgyzstan has indicated it will undertake 
reform but it is too early to assess the impact of the inquiry on bride-
kidnapping.
174
 More research is required to fully understand the domestic 
impact of the inquiry procedures. Enforcing treaty body recommendations 
is a perennial challenge in international law. It is imperative that, when 
initiating an inquiry procedure, CSOs give careful consideration to how 
they will use the final inquiry report strategically in domestic and 
international, legal and political forums. Despite the strengths of the 
inquiry procedure, it is often ignored in international human rights law. It 
warrants greater consideration by those seeking to challenge laws, policies 
and practices that contribute to grave and widespread violations. 
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